We study the optimization problem faced by a perfectly informed principal in a Bayesian game, who reveals information to the players about the state of nature to obtain a desirable equilibrium. This signaling problem is the natural design question motivated by uncertainty in games and has attracted much recent attention. We present almost-optimal hardness results for signaling problems in (a) Bayesian two-player zero-sum games, and (b) Bayesian network routing games.
Introduction
In Bayesian games, players' payoffs depend on the state of nature, which may be hidden from the players. Instead, players receive a signal regarding the state of nature which they use to form beliefs about their payoffs, and choose their strategies. Thus the strategic decisions and payoffs of the players depend crucially on the information available from the signal they receive. Since applications are often rife with uncertainty, understanding the effect of information available to players is a fundamental problem in game theory; see, e.g., [Bla51, Ake70, Hir71, MW82, LRS10, BBM13] . Whereas for a single player, it is known that more information leads to better payoffs [Bla51] , with multiple players, outcomes are more complex and often counterintuitive with "more" (information) not necessarily translating to "better" (payoffs). The latter was first observed by Hirshleifer [Hir71] ; recently, [Dug14] gave an example where neither full-revelation nor no-revelation is optimal.
While classical work has focused on the role of information in influencing strategies, the computational problem of designing optimal information structures for Bayesian games, commonly called the signaling problem, has received much recent attention [BMS12, DIR14, EFG + 12, GD13]. Here, a perfectly-informed principal seeks to reveal selective information to the players to optimize some function of the resulting equilibrium, such as the revenue, or payoff of a particular player. Twoplayer zero-sum games and network routing games are natural starting points for investigating the signaling problem due to their fundamental importance and appealing structure. They admit a canonical, tractable choice of equilibrium; as noted in [Dug14] , this also decouples the concerns of optimal-signaling computation and equilibrium computation.
Our results. We study signaling in two widely studied classes of games: two-player zero-sum games, and network routing games. As in much of previous work, in our setting players share the same prior belief on the state of nature, and signaling schemes are symmetric: they reveal the same information to all players. Our main contribution is to derive hardness results for these classes of games that tighten, and in some cases close, the gap between what is achievable in polytime (or quasi-polytime) and what is intractable.
In Section 4, we consider Bayesian (two-player) zero-sum games, in which the principal seeks to maximize the value of the game, or equivalently the equilibrium payoff of the row player. 1 First, we settle the complexity of the signaling problem with respect to NP-hardness by showing that the problem is NP-hard; in fact, it is NP-hard to obtain an (additive) FPTAS (Theorem 4.1). Previous work by Dughmi [Dug14] ruled out an FPTAS assuming the hardness of the planted clique problem, wherein one seeks to recover a clique planted in an Erdös-Rényi random graph. Thus, we replace planted-clique hardness, an average-case hardness assumption, with the much more conventional worst-case assumption of NP-hardness. Next, we consider the hardness of obtaining a PTAS for the signaling problem. One cannot hope to prove NP-hardness here since there is a quasi-polytime approximation scheme for signaling [CCD + 15] (so in this sense, our NP-hardness result is tight). We show that assuming planted-clique hardness, there does not exist a PTAS for the signaling problem (Theorem 4.4). Previously, the non-existence of a PTAS was shown (again assuming planted-clique hardness) only for implicit zero-sum games with quasi-polynomial-size strategy sets [Dug14] .
Complementing these hardness results, we devise a PTAS for a structured class of Bayesian zerosum games (Theorem 4.14), which includes network security games (studied earlier) with bounded payoffs.
In Section 5, we consider the signaling problem in Bayesian network routing games, wherein the principal seeks to minimize the average latency of the equilibrium flow. We show that it is NP-hard to obtain any multiplicative approximation better than we show that full revelation obtains the price of anarchy of the routing game as its approximation ratio (Theorem 5.4), which is 4 3 for linear latency functions [RT02] . These are the first results for signaling in Bayesian network routing games.
Finally, we obtain hardness results for two related signaling problems in Bayesian zero-sum games (Section 6). We rule out a PTAS for computing the best prior (the maximum prior problem), under the exponential time hypothesis (ETH). Further, if the principal's value depends on the players' strategies, and not just their payoffs, we show that obtaining a PTAS is NP-hard.
Our techniques. Our results for Bayesian zero-sum games are obtained via two main ideas. Our NP-hardness result, the PTAS for a structured class of games, and the PTAS-hardness for the maximum prior problem, all follow by considering the signaling problem from a dual perspective. The signaling problem can be written as a mathematical program (P) with linear objective and constraints, but an infinite number of variables. Ignoring this issue, we can consider the dual problem (D). Motivated by the separation problem for the dual, we consider the dual signaling problem (Section 3). Our key insight is that the dual signaling problem is a rather useful tool for both deriving hardness results and devising approximation algorithms. This usefulness stems from the equivalence of separation and optimization [GLS93] , which shows that an algorithm for the separation problem can be used to solve the optimization problem and vice versa. We exploit and build upon this equivalence. We prove that this equivalence holds despite the infinite-dimensionality of (P), and furthermore, is approximation preserving: an FPTAS for signaling yields an FP-TAS for the dual signaling problem (Theorem 4.2), and a PTAS for the dual signaling problem yields a PTAS for signaling (Theorem 4.10).
This equivalence paves the way for our results. Whereas, typically, an (approximate) separation oracle is used to (approximately) solve the optimization problem, we exploit this equivalence in an unorthodox fashion by also leveraging the hardness of the dual signaling problem to prove hardness results for the signaling (i.e., primal optimization) problem. We show that it is NP-hard to obtain an FPTAS for the dual signaling problem, and thus obtain that it is NP-hard to obtain an FPTAS for the signaling problem. Notably, in contrast to the (weaker) planted-clique hardness result in [Dug14] for the signaling problem, we obtain our NP-hardness result with minimal effort, a fact that underscores the benefits of moving to the dual signaling problem. On the positive side, we obtain a PTAS for the dual signaling problem for our structured class of Bayesian zero-sum games, which thus yields a PTAS for the signaling problem for this class. Interestingly, when cast in the mixture-selection framework of [CCD + 15], the signaling problem for this structured class does not satisfy the noise-stability property stated in [CCD + 15]. It is noteworthy that we bypass the hardness results in [CCD + 15] for mixture selection in the absence of noise stability, and obtain a PTAS. Finally, we show that a PTAS for the maximum-prior problem yields a PTAS for the dual signaling problem, and we rule out the latter via a simple, clean reduction from the best-Nash problem and the recent result of [BKW15] .
Our second main idea, used to rule out a PTAS assuming planted-clique hardness, is a "direct" reduction that combines and strengthens techniques from [Dug14, FNS07] . We utilize the planted clique cover problem defined in [Dug14] -multiple cliques are now planted and one seeks to recover a constant fraction of them-and shown to be at least as hard as the planted clique problem. The idea is to set up a Bayesian zero-sum game where both the principal and the row player must randomize over Ω(log n)-size high-density node sets for the signaling scheme to achieve large value; recovering these large-density sets from a near-optimal signaling scheme allows one to solve the planted-clique cover (and hence, the planted clique) problem. The FPTAS-hardness reduction in [Dug14] creates a network security game (see Section 2) with payoffs of absolute value Ω(log 2 n) (or alternatively, a quasi-polynomial-size strategy set for the column player) to enforce the above property. Payoffs of magnitude Ω(log n) seem necessary with this kind of approach, which therefore only yields an O 1 log n gap that is insufficient to rule out a PTAS. We abandon the use of network security games and instead leverage a device from [FNS07] to ensure the above "large-spreading" property. This idea is also used to show planted-clique hardness for the best-Nash problem [HK11] ; however (unlike [HK11] ), we are constrained to work with zero-sum games, and therefore need to apply this idea carefully. A subtle, but crucial, technical issue is that we need to significantly tighten the planted-clique recovery result in [Dug14] . To recover a specific planted clique S of size k = ω(log 2 n) (in the presence of other such planted cliques), Dughmi [Dug14] requires a set T with |T | = Θ(k), |S ∩ T | = Ω(k), whereas we only require that |T |, |S ∩ T | = Ω(log n), and this is crucial since we can only ensure that spreading takes place over O(log n)-size sets.
Our hardness result for Bayesian routing games is a direct reduction from the problem of computing edge tolls that minimize the total (latency + toll)-cost of the resulting equilibrium flow, which is inapproximable within a factor of Related work. Whereas understanding the role of information in influencing strategies is a classical problem in game theory, the computational problem of designing optimal information structures has been studied more recently. Much of this work has focused on signaling in auctions, where the goal is to maximize revenue [EFG + 12, BMS12, GD13] or social welfare [DIR14] . Dughmi [Dug14] initiated the computational study of signaling in Bayesian zero-sum games, and obtained various hardness results under the planted-clique hardness assumption. This work left open the question of whether hardness results can be obtained under standard worst-case assumptions, such as P =NP, a question that we answer in the affirmative. On the positive side, Cheng et al. [CCD + 15] showed that for Bayesian normal form games with a constant number of players and for general objectives of the principal, an ǫ-approximate signaling scheme that maximizes the objective at an ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium can be computed in quasi-polynomial time. This work left open the question of whether a PTAS is possible for signaling in Bayesian zero-sum games. We preclude this under the planted-clique hardness assumption, and complementing this, design a PTAS for a structured class of games. As noted earlier, the latter result does not follow from [CCD + 15] since the resulting signaling problem fails to have small noise stability.
The planted-clique problem was introduced by Jerrum [Jer92] and Kucera [Kuč95] , and despite extensive efforts (see, e.g., [AV14, FR10, DGGP11] and the references therein), no polytime algorithm is known for recovering cliques of size k = o( √ n). There is a quasi-polytime algorithm known when k ≥ 2 log 2 n; on the other hand, various algorithmic strategies have been ruled out for this problem [Jer92, FK03, FGR + 13]. The planted-clique problem has thus been used in various reductions (see, e.g., [HK11, JP00]), and is an example where an average-case hardness assumption has been used to derive hardness results. Recently, Rubinstein [Rub15] has independently also obtained hardness results for signaling in Bayesian zero-sum games. He shows that there is no additive PTAS for signaling assuming ETH, and that obtaining a multiplicative PTAS is NP-hard. These results are orthogonal to ours, as there is no known reduction between ETH and planted-clique hardness. Further, NP-hardness of a multiplicative PTAS does not rule out an additive FPTAS.
Preliminaries and notation
Let R + denote the set of nonnegative reals. For an integer n, let [n] denote {1, 2, . . . , n}. For a finite set S = ∅, let ∆ S := {x ∈ R S + : i∈S x i = 1} denote the (|S| − 1)-dimensional simplex. For an integer n ≥ 1, we use ∆ n to denote ∆ [n] . Let 1 n ∈ R n be the vector with 1 in all its entries, I n×n be the n × n identity matrix, and e i be the vector containing 1 as its i-th entry and 0 elsewhere.
Bayesian zero-sum games and signaling schemes. A Bayesian zero-sum game is specified by a tuple Θ, {A θ } θ∈Θ , λ , where Θ = {1, . . . , M } denotes the states of nature, λ is a prior distribution on the states of nature (so λ ∈ ∆ Θ = ∆ M ), and A θ ∈ [−1, 1] r×c is a payoff matrix associated with the state of nature θ representing the payoffs of the row player in a zero-sum game. Let µ ∈ ∆ M be a distribution over states of nature. Then A µ := θ∈Θ µ θ A θ is the matrix of expected payoffs for the row player under distribution µ.
A (symmetric) signaling scheme is a policy where a principal reveals (identical) partial information about the state of nature to the players. More precisely, a signaling scheme specifies a signal-set Σ and a (possibly randomized) map ϕ : Θ → Σ. When the state θ is revealed, the principal computes a (random) signal σ = ϕ(θ). Both players receive σ and correspondingly update their belief on the state-distribution to µ σ , and play the zero-sum game given by A µσ . As observed in [Dug14] , any signaling scheme is equivalent to specifying a convex decomposition of λ: i.e., specifying Σ, α, {µ σ } σ∈Σ , where α ∈ ∆ Σ , and the posterior distributions {µ σ } σ∈Σ satisfy σ∈Σ α σ µ σ = λ. Given this convex-decomposition view, we will interchangeably use (Σ, α, µ), and α = α µ µ∈∆ M (with finite support) to denote a signaling scheme; in the latter case, Σ corresponds to the finite support of α and the posterior distributions used are {µ : α µ > 0}.
The quality of a signaling scheme α is given by µ∈∆ M α µ f (µ), where f : ∆ M → R is the principal's objective function that measures the quality of the equilibria of the zero-sum game defined by the (row-player) payoff-matrix A µ . For the bulk of our results, following [Dug14] , we consider the objective function f that evaluates to the row-player's equilibrium payoff in the zero-sum game specified by A µ . Formally, let val(µ) be the row-player's payoff under a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game specified by A µ . Note that val(µ) is well-defined (although there could be multiple Nash equilibria) and coincides with the max-min value of the row player, so
The signaling problem in a Bayesian zero-sum game is then to find a convex decomposition α that maximizes µ∈∆ M α µ val(µ). (By Caratheodory's theorem, M + 1 posteriors suffice to specify any convex decomposition.) Let opt(I) denote the optimum value for a Bayesian zero-sum game I. We say that an algorithm for the signaling problem is an (additive) ε-approximation algorithm if for every instance I the algorithm runs in polytime and returns a signaling scheme of value at least opt(I) − ε. A polytime approximation scheme (PTAS) is an algorithm that runs in polytime and returns a solution of value at least opt(I) − ε for every instance I and constant ε > 0; an FPTAS is a PTAS whose running time for an instance I and parameter ε is poly size of I,
Security games. Some of our results utilize a class of zero-sum games that we call extended security games, wherein the payoff matrix for state θ is given by
Let B and D be matrices having columns {b 1 , . . . , b M }, and {d 1 , . . . , d M } respectively. We obtain the following expressions for A µ and val(µ) for µ ∈ ∆ M .
A special case of an extended security game (and the reason for this terminology) is the network security game defined by [Dug14] . Here, we are given an undirected graph G = (V, E) with n = |V | and a parameter ρ ≥ 0. The states of nature correspond to the vertices of the graph. The row and column players are called attacker and defender respectively. The attacker's pure strategies correspond to nodes of G, and in the single-node-defender version, the defender's pure strategies also correspond to nodes of G. Let B be the adjacency matrix of G, and set A = D T = −ρI n×n . Then, for a given state of nature θ ∈ V , and pure strategies a, d ∈ V of the attacker and defender, the payoff of the attacker is given by e T a Be θ − ρ(e T a + e T θ )e d . The interpretation is that the attacker gets a payoff of 1 if he selects a vertex a that is adjacent to θ. This payoff is reduced by ρ if the defender's vertex d lies in {θ, a}, and by 2ρ if d = θ = a.
Planted clique and planted clique cover. Some of our hardness results are based on the hardness of the planted-clique and planted clique cover problems. The latter problem was introduced by Dughmi [Dug14] .
Definition 2.1 (Planted clique cover problem PCover(n, p, k, r) [Dug14] ). Let G ∼ G(n, p, k, r) be a random graph generated by: (1) including every edge independently with probability p; and (2) for i = 1, . . . , r, picking a set S i of k vertices uniformly at random, adding all edges having both endpoints in S i . We call the S i s the planted cliques and p the background density. We seek to recover a constant fraction of the planted cliques S 1 , . . . , S r , given G ∼ G(n, p, k, r).
In the planted clique problem PClique(n, p, k), there is a single planted clique (r = 1) and the goal is to recover this clique. The following hardness assumption for the planted-clique problem has been used in deriving various hardness results.
Conjecture 1 (Planted-clique conjecture). For some k = k(n) satisfying k = ω(log n) and k = o( √ n), there is no probabilistic polytime algorithm that solves PClique n, 1 2 , k with constant success probability.
The ellipsoid method. We utilize the ellipsoid method to translate hardness and approximation results for the dual of the signaling problem to signaling.
Theorem 2.2 (Chapters 4, 6 in [GLS93]; Section 9.2 in [NY83]
). Let X ⊆ R n be a polytope described by constraints having encoding length at most L. Suppose that for each y ∈ R n , we can determine in time poly(size of y, L) if y / ∈ X and if so, return a hyperplane of encoding length at most L separating y from X.
(i) One can use the ellipsoid method to find a point x ∈ X or determine if X = ∅ in time poly(n, L).
(ii) Let h : R n → R be a concave function and K = sup x∈X h(x) − inf x∈X h(x). Suppose we have a value oracle for h that for every x ∈ X, returns ψ(x) satisfying |ψ(x) − h(x)| ≤ δ. There exists a polynomial p(n) such that for any ǫ ≥ p(n)δ, we can use the shallow-cut ellipsoid method to find
) and using at most T queries to the value oracle for h.
The dual signaling problem
Let S := ∆ M . We use S and ∆ M interchangeably in the sequel. The signaling problem can be formulated as the following mathematical program,
Notice that any feasible α must also satisfy µ∈S α µ = 1; hence, α is indeed a distribution over S, and a feasible solution to (P) yields a signaling scheme. Let opt(λ) denote the optimal value of (P), and note that this is a concave function of λ. Although (P) has a linear objective and linear constraints, it is not quite a linear program (LP) since there are an infinite number of variables. Ignoring this issue for now, we consider the following dual of (P).
The separation problem for (D) motivates the following dual signaling problem.
Definition 3.1 (Dual signaling with precision parameter ε). Given a Bayesian zero-sum game Θ, {A θ } θ∈Θ , λ , w ∈ R M , and ε > 0, distinguish between:
The threshold signaling problem is the special case of dual signaling where w = η1 M for some η ∈ R.
Notice that the dual signaling problem is unconstrained: λ plays no role. We say that an algorithm is an FPTAS for the dual signaling problem if it solves the dual signaling problem in time poly size of (I, w), 1 ε for every input (I, w, ε).
Bayesian zero-sum games
We now consider Bayesian zero-sum games and prove the following results. We show that the signaling problem does not admit an FPTAS unless P=NP (Theorem 4.1) and does not admit a PTAS assuming the hardness of the planted-clique problem (Theorem 4.4). Complementing these hardness results, we present a PTAS for a structured class of extended security games in Section 4.3. Proof. Let Θ, {A θ }, λ , η1 M , ε be the input to the threshold signaling problem, with precision parameter ε. Note that for any µ ∈ ∆ M , we have −1 ≤ opt(µ) ≤ 1 since |A θ i,j | ≤ 1 for all θ, i, j. Let p(M ) be the polynomial given by part (ii) of Theorem 2.2. Set q(M ) = p(M ) + 1. We utilize part (ii) of Theorem 2.2 with X = ∆ M , δ = ε q(M ) , h(·) = opt(·) (which is concave, as noted earlier), K = 2, and using B as the imperfect value oracle, to find z ∈ ∆ M in polytime such that opt(z) ≥ max µ∈∆ M opt(µ) − p(M )δ. We run B on the prior z to obtain a signaling scheme α of value v ≥ opt(z) − ε. If v ≥ η, then we cannot be in case (ii); so we return that we are in case (i) and one of the points µ ∈ ∆ M with α µ > 0 must satisfy val(µ) ≥ η. If v < η, then we have max µ∈∆ M val(µ) ≤ max µ∈∆ M opt(µ) < η + p(M ) + 1)δ, so we return that we are in case (ii).
NP-hardness of obtaining an FPTAS
Theorem 4.3. There is no FPTAS for the threshold signaling problem, even for network security games, unless P=NP.
Proof. The proof follows readily via a reduction from the balanced complete bipartite subgraph (BCBS) problem [GJ79] , which illustrates the convenience of working with the dual signaling problem. In BCBS, given a bipartite graph G = (V ∪ W, E) and an integer r ≥ 0, we want to determine if G contains K r,r (i.e., an r ×r biclique). Given a BCBS instance, set ε = 1 2n 8 , where n = |V |+|W |, and η = 1 − (2n + 1)ε. We create a Bayesian network security game by letting G be the graph in the network security game, and setting ρ = 2rnε. Recall that this means that states of nature correspond to nodes of G, so Θ = V ∪ W , and the payoff matrix for a distribution µ ∈ ∆ Θ is given by (2) where B is the adjacency matrix of G and A = D T = −ρI n×n . This creates an instance of the threshold signaling problem with precision parameter ε; the prior λ is irrelevant. We show that solving this instance would decide the BCBS-instance.
If G has the required subgraph
Suppose there exists µ ∈ ∆ M so that val(µ) ≥ η − ε. We show then that G contains K r,r . Let x be the equilibrium strategy of the attacker, so val(µ) =
, otherwise val(µ) < 1 − (2n + 2)ε. Hence,
(1+1/n) = r(1 − 1/n), and therefore |V ′ | ≥ r. Similarly |W ′ | ≥ r, and this yields the r × r biclique.
We conjecture that Theorem 4.2 can, in fact, be strengthened to show that an ε-approximation for signaling yields an O(ε)-approximation for threshold signaling, so that a PTAS for signaling yields a PTAS for threshold signaling. This would rule out a sub-quasipolytime approximation scheme (i.e., an nΩ (log 1−o(1) n) -time approximation scheme) for signaling under the (deterministic) exponential time hypothesis (ETH), since we prove in Section 6 that there is no sub-quasi-PTAS for threshold signaling assuming ETH. 2 This is an optimal hardness result since a quasi-PTAS follows from [CCD + 15]. Such a strengthening would follow by tightening part (ii) of Theorem 2.2; we leave this as an intriguing open question. Below, we rule out a PTAS for signaling under an orthogonal hardness assumption.
Planted-clique hardness of obtaining a PTAS
Theorem 4.4. There is a constant ε 0 such that, assuming Conjecture 1, there is no ε 0 -approximation for the signaling problem in Bayesian zero-sum games.
Our hardness result strengthens the one in [Dug14] , which rules out an FPTAS assuming the planted-clique conjecture. The reduction therein creates a network security game from a graph G ∼ G n, 1 2 , k, r (see Section 2). The idea is that if a signaling scheme achieves value close to 1, then it must place a large weight on posteriors and attacker mixed-strategies that randomize over a large set of nodes. Further, the posterior and attacker must essentially identify dense components of G, as otherwise the attacker's value would be close to the background density 1 2 . As noted earlier, a limitation of this type of construction is that the parameter ρ used in the network security game needs to be roughly Ω(log n) to ensure that the posterior and the attacker's mixed strategies are supported on an Ω(log n)-size set of nodes. This only yields an Θ 1 polylog(n) gap, which is insufficient to rule out a PTAS. We overcome this obstacle by moving away from a network security game, and instead exploiting an idea of [FNS07] to eliminate all equilibria of O(log n)-size support from the game. Theorem 4.4 follows immediately by combining Lemmas 4.5 and 4.6.
there is a polytime algorithm that takes as input G ∼ G n, 1 2 , k, r with planted cliques {S i }, and outputs a family T ⊆ 2 V of clusters satisfying the following with constant probability, for any constant c 3 ≥ 10 3 :
Then there is a polynomial-time algorithm for PClique n, 1 2 , k having constant success probability. Lemma 4.6. Let k = k(n) satisfy k = ω(log n) and k = o( √ n), and r = 5n k . There is a polynomialtime randomized reduction that takes a graph G ∼ G n, 1 2 , k, r as input and outputs a Bayesian zero-sum game such that the following hold with high probability. (Completeness) There is a signaling scheme having value at least 0.99.
(Soundness) Given a signaling scheme of value at least 0.97, one can obtain in polytime a collection T of clusters satisfying condition (*) in Lemma 4.5.
Above, and throughout this section, when we say with high probability, we mean success probability 1 − 1 poly(n) . The Bayesian zero-sum game we construct always admits a signaling scheme of large value; however finding a near-optimal signaling scheme in polytime would refute the plantedclique conjecture. Lemma 4.5 (proved in Appendix A) is similar to a planted-clique recovery result proved in [Dug14] . While we utilize similar ideas, our result works under much weaker requirements. Our lemma allows clusters in T to have size Θ(log n)-which is crucial for Lemma 4.6-whereas in [Dug14] , the clusters need to have size ω(log 2 n). In the rest of this section, we prove Lemma 4.6. We use the following parameters.
To keep the presentation simple, we give a construction where E) . We split G into G − and G + with corresponding adjacency matrices A − G and A + G where G − are the background edges and G + are the clique edges added in steps (1) and (2) of Definition 2.1 respectively. The states of nature and the row-player's strategies correspond to the nodes of G. The prior λ is 1 n /n. For every θ ∈ Θ = V , the payoff matrix
, which are defined as follows:
(1) a θ is the θ-th column of the adjacency matrix A G , so a θ i = 1 if (i, θ) ∈ E and is 0 otherwise. (2) B is an n × N matrix, where each B i,j is set independently to 2 − Z with probability 3 4Z , and 2 otherwise. . The remaining 2N pure strategies of Col are used to force the principal and Row to choose a posterior µ and mixed strategy x respectively that are "well spread out".
The average of the entries in any column of B or D is 5 4 > max i a θ i . Exploiting this, Claim 4.7(i) implies that if x and µ both randomize uniformly over a large set of vertices, Col plays column 1. The completeness proof now follows from the oft-used idea of (roughly speaking) choosing posteriors and mixed strategies for Row that randomize uniformly over the planted cliques. Conversely, if x or µ has support of size at most c 2 log n, then Claim 4.7(ii) implies that Col can play some column of B or D and make val(µ) negative Thus, in order to obtain value close to 1, both µ and Row have to randomize over Ω(log n)-size sets of nodes. Using this, one can carefully extract a collection of node-sets satisfying condition (*) of Lemma 4.5. This yields the soundness proof.
The following properties about the above construction will be useful. Proof. We first prove (i). The proof is a standard application of Chernoff bounds, and is also essentially shown in [HK11] . We prove the statement for B; the argument for D is identical. Fix a column j ∈ [N ]. We have E i∈R B i,j |R| = 5 4 , where the expectation is over the random construction of B. Since |R| = ω(log n), the size of R is large enough so that Chernoff bounds imply that
The union bound over all N columns yields the claim. We now prove (ii). The proof again follows from Chernoff bounds, and is the key insight in [FNS07] (also utilized in [HK11] ). Fix some R ⊆ V with |R| = c 2 log n. We prove the statement for B; the proof for D is identical. For a given j ∈ [N ], we have Pr[∃i ∈ R s.t.
Taking the union bound over all R ⊆ V with |R| = c 2 log n, we obtain
c 2 log n ≤ 1 − 1/ poly(n).
Lemma 4.8 (Proposition B
Lemma 4.9. With high probability, for all S, T ⊆ V with |S|, |T | ≥ c 2 log n, bi-density
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 4.8 since c 2 = 10 5 satisfies c 2 ≥ 24 · 2.1 · max 1, 1+ǫ ǫ 2 .
Completeness proof in Lemma 4.6
We use a deterministic signaling scheme that groups together states of nature in the same planted clique. Let S 1 , . . . , S r be the planted cliques in G in some arbitrary order. Let
n and µ σ is the uniform distribution over S ′ σ . (Note that the signaling scheme is independent of B and D.)
For posterior µ σ , where σ = 0, consider the strategy x σ where Row plays the uniform distribution on S ′ σ . Claim 4.7(i) implies that Col's best response to x σ is to play column 1 (with probability 1). Therefore, val(
With r = 5n k , we have |A| ≤ e 0.1 · E[|A|] ≤ e −4.9 n with high probability due to standard Chernoff bounds (since the events {v ∈ A} v∈V are negatively correlated). Therefore, for suitably large n, with high probability, |S ′ 0 | ≤ |A| + 5n k · k 10 4 ≤ e −4.7 n. So, with high probability, the signaling scheme has value at least σ∈Σ∩[r] α σ 1 − 
Soundness proof in Lemma 4.6
For a signal σ ∈ Σ with corresponding posterior µ σ , let x σ denote Row's equilibrium strategy for A µσ . We first filter out the set of "useful" signals, i.e., those with relatively high value. Let Σ 1 = {σ ∈ Σ : val(µ σ ) ≥ 1 − √ ǫ}. We show that for all σ ∈ Σ 1 , µ σ and x σ place a significant mass over a large set of nodes, and use this insight to extract clusters. Fix ǫ = 0.03. For every signal
, and letx σ be the uniform distribution on T σ . We output T = {T σ : σ ∈ Σ 1 }.
We show that T satisfies condition (*) in Lemma 4.5. The value of the signaling scheme is σ∈Σ α σ val(µ σ ) ≥ 1 − ǫ. Noting that val(µ) ≤ 1 for all µ, by Markov's inequality, we have
(Given a vector v ∈ R k , and S ⊆ [k], we use v(S) to denote i∈S v i .) Assume that the high probability event in Claim 4.7(ii) happens.
Fix σ ∈ Σ 1 . For any R ⊆ V with |R| ≤ c 2 log n, we must have
Otherwise, suppose x σ (R) > 2 Z (the argument for µ σ is similar). Then, considering the column j of B having B i,j = 2 − Z for all i ∈ R, we have i∈[n] (x σ ) i B i,j ≤ (2 − Z)x σ (R) + 2 1 − x σ (R) < 0, which implies that val(µ σ ) < 0. Now since 1 − √ ǫ ≤ val(µ σ ) ≤ 1, by the definition of T σ and
Markov's inequality, we have x σ (T σ ) ≥ 2 Z , and hence |T σ | ≥ c 2 log n. We now switch from x σ tõ x σ in order to relate the value of the signaling scheme to bi-density and deduce that T satisfies condition (*). As before, G − are the background edges and G + are the clique edges added in steps (1) and (2) 
85. Therefore, we obtain that
Inequality ( * * ) follows since for every v ∈ Θ, we have 
A PTAS for structured extended security games
We now devise a PTAS for a structured class of extended security games (Theorem 4.14). First, we reduce the signaling problem to the dual signaling problem using the ellipsoid method (Theorem 4.10). This reduction applies to all Bayesian zero-sum games. Next, we devise a PTAS for the dual signaling problem for our class of extended network security games (Theorem 4.14).
Theorem 4.10 (Dual signaling to signaling). A polytime algorithm for the dual signaling problem with precision ε gives a 5ε-approximation algorithm for the signaling problem. In particular, a PTAS for the dual signaling problem yields a PTAS for the signaling problem.
To prove Theorem 4.10, we utilize the ellipsoid method, specifically, part (i) of Theorem 2.2, adapting the standard transformation from separation to optimization to take into account the additive error in the dual separation problem. To circumvent the technical difficulties caused by the infinite-dimensionality of (P), we approximate (P) by a finite-dimensional LP, where we restrict the variables in (P), and, analogously the constraints in (D) to a suitable δ-net of ∆ M . Let I = Θ, {A θ }, λ be a Bayesian zero-sum game. Recall that |A θ i,j | ≤ 1 for all θ, i, j. For δ ∈ (0, 1] with 1/δ ∈ Z, and µ ∈ ∆ M , define
For any µ ∈ ∆ M , note that
It is easy to see that µ lies in the convex hull conv(S δ (µ)) of S δ (µ).
Proof. The entries in A µ and A µ ′ differ by at most M δ. Hence for every mixed-strategy profile
We can efficiently findμ ∈ S δ (µ) that minimizes w T µ ′ over µ ′ ∈ S δ (µ) since this can be cast as an LP. Then, we have
We work with the following finite-dimensional counterparts of (P) and (D) and argue that this approximation only yields a small error.
Since λ ∈ conv(S δ (λ)), (P δ ) is feasible for any λ ∈ ∆ M . Clearly, any solution to (P δ ) gives a solution to (P) of equal value. The converse is also approximately true.
Lemma 4.12. Any feasible solution α to (P) of value v gives a solution to (P δ ) of value at least v − M δ. Hence, opt (P δ ) ≥ opt (P) − M δ.
Proof. This is an easy consequence of Claim 4.11. For any µ ∈ S, let τ (µ) ∈ ∆ S δ (µ) be some convex decomposition of µ. Then
µ ′ for all µ ′ ∈ S δ , we obtain that α ′ is a feasible solution to (P δ ). To compare the objective values of α and α ′ , note that
Now the basic idea is to solve (D δ ) using the ellipsoid method using the algorithm B to obtain a separation oracle for (D δ ) with an additive error. In the course of solving (D δ ), we also obtain a polynomial-size LP consisting of the violated inequalities of (D δ ) returned by the separation oracle during the execution of the ellipsoid method whose optimal value is the same as opt (D δ ). Taking the dual of this compact LP yields an LP of the same form as (P δ ) but with α µ variables for only polynomially many points in S δ ; solving this yields the desired approximate signaling scheme. The additive error in the separation oracle for (D δ ) complicates the arguments slightly. We now discuss the details. Set δ = ε/M . Let B be the algorithm for solving the dual signaling problem with precision ε. For a given ν, ǫ ∈ R, consider the set Q(ν, ǫ) := {w ∈ R M : w T λ ≤ ν, w T µ ≥ val(µ) − ǫ ∀µ ∈ S δ }. Note that the constraints of Q(ν, ǫ) have encoding length poly M, size of (λ, ν, δ, ǫ) . For a given ν and w ∈ R M , we can determine if w ∈ Q(ν, ε), or find a hyperplane separating w from Q(ν, −2ε), as follows. We first check if w T λ ≤ ν and if not, then return this as the separating hyperplane. We run B on the input (I, w, ε) . If B determines that we are case (i), then it also returns µ ∈ ∆ M with val(µ) ≥ w T µ − ε. By Claim 4.11, we can then findμ ∈ S δ (µ) such that w Tμ − val(μ) ≤ 2ε, so we can use w Tμ − val(μ) ≥ 2ε to separate w from Q(ν, −2ε). If B determines that we are in case (ii), then we are certainly not in case (i), so we have val(µ) ≤ w T µ + ε for all µ ∈ ∆ M , which implies that w ∈ Q(ν, ε).
So for a fixed ν, in polynomial time, the ellipsoid method either certifies that Q(ν, −2ε) = ∅ or returns a point in Q(ν, ε). We find the smallest ν (via binary search) such that the latter case happens; call this value ν * . Then,
The equality above follows since the dual of the minimization LP is above is (P δ ) with the objective function changed to
For any ǫ > 0, running the ellipsoid method for ν = ν * − ǫ yields a polynomial-size certificate for the emptiness of Q(ν * − ǫ, −2ε) consisting of the inequality w T λ ≤ ν * − ǫ and the polynomially many violated inequalities w T µ − val(µ) ≥ 2ε returned during the execution of the ellipsoid method. Let T ⊆ S δ be the polynomial-size set of points for which we obtain these violated inequalities. By duality, this means that
Thus, solving the polynomial-size LP on the right yields a signaling scheme of value at least opt (P δ ) − 3ε − ǫ, so taking ǫ = ε and using Lemma 4.12, we obtain a signaling scheme of value at least opt (P) − 5ε.
Definition 4.13 (γ-Lipschitz). A matrix
for all x, x ′ ∈ ∆ r . An extended security game specified by matrices A, B, D (see (1), (2)) is γ-Lipschitz if D T is γ-Lipschitz. We place no constraints on the matrices A and B.
We design a simple PTAS for the dual signaling problem on γ-Lipschitz extended security games, for constant γ. By Theorem 4.10, this yields a PTAS for the signaling problem for γ-Lipschitz extended security games.
Theorem 4.14. There is a PTAS for the dual signaling problem on γ-Lipschitz extended security games. This yields a PTAS for the signaling problem on γ-Lipschitz extended-security games.
Proof. Given Theorem 4.10, we only need to prove the first statement. Let (I, w, ε) be the input to the dual signaling problem where I is a γ-Lipschitz extended security game. Set ε ′ = ε/γ. Our algorithm simply findsμ = argmax µ∈S ε ′ val(µ) − w T µ by exhaustive search. If val(μ) − w Tμ ≥ 0, we state that we are in case (i) and returnμ; else we state that we are in case (ii).
First, note that the algorithm runs in time poly size of I, M Let µ * maximize val(µ) − w T µ, and x * be the equilibrium strategy for the row player in the resulting zero-sum game. We claim that val(µ * ) − w T µ * ≤ val(μ) − w Tμ + ε, which shows that we correctly solve the dual signaling problem: if case (i) applies, then val(μ) − w Tμ ≥ 0; if case (ii) applies, then clearly, val(μ) − w Tμ < −ε.
We now prove the claim. Since µ * ∈ conv(S ε ′ (µ * )), there exists some
Bayesian network routing games
We now consider the signaling problem in Bayesian network routing games and prove an optimal inapproximability result for linear latency functions: It is NP-hard to obtain a multiplicative approximation better than 4/3 (Theorem 5.1), and this approximation is achieved for linear latency functions by a simple signaling scheme that simply reveals the state of nature (Theorem 5.4).
A network routing game is a tuple
, where G is a directed graph with latency function l e : R + → R + on each edge e. Each (s i , t i , d i ) denotes a commodity; d i specifies the volume of flow routed from s i to t i by self-interested agents, each of whom controls an infinitesimal amount of flow and selects an s i -t i path as her strategy. A strategy profile thus corresponds to a multicommodity flow composed of s i -t i flows of volume d i for all i; we call any such flow a feasible flow. The latency on edge e due to a flow f is given by l e (f e ), where f e is the total flow on e. The latency of a path P is given by l P (f ) := e∈P l e (f e ). The total latency of a flow f is defined to be C(l; f ) := e∈E f e l e (f e ); an optimal flow is a feasible flow with minimum latency. A feasible flow f in a routing game is a Nash flow (also called a Wardrop flow), if each player chooses a minimum latency path; that is, for all i, all s i -t i paths P , Q with f e > 0 for all e ∈ P , we have l P (f ) ≤ l Q (f ). All Nash flows have the same total latency (see, e.g., [RT02] ).
In a Bayesian network routing game, the edge latency functions {l θ e } e∈E may depend on the state of nature θ ∈ Θ (and, as before, we have a prior λ ∈ ∆ Θ ). The principal seeks to minimize the latency of the Nash flow. Given µ ∈ ∆ Θ , the expected latency function on each edge e is l µ e (x e ) := θ∈Θ µ θ l θ e (x e ). Define val(µ) := C(l µ ; f µ ), where f µ is the Nash flow for latency functions {l µ e }. The signaling problem in a Bayesian routing game is to determine (α µ ) µ∈∆ M ≥ 0 of finite support specifying a convex decomposition of λ (i.e., µ∈∆ M α µ µ = λ) that minimizes the expected latency of the Nash flow, µ∈∆ M α µ val(µ).
Theorem 5.1. For any ǫ > 0, obtaining a (4/3 − ǫ)-approximation for the signaling problem in Bayesian routing games is NP-hard, even in single-commodity games with linear latency functions. Let G, s, t, d be a single-commodity routing game. We reduce from the problem of determining edge tolls τ ∈ R E + that minimize C l + τ ; f NE (τ ) , where l + τ denotes the collection of latency functions {l e (x)+τ e } e and f NE (τ ) is the Nash flow for l+τ . Note that C(l+τ ; f ) = e f e (l e (f e )+τ e ) takes into account the contribution from tolls; we refer to this as the total cost of f . By optimal tolls, we mean tolls τ that minimize C l + τ ; f NE (τ ) .
Theorem 5.2 ([CDR06]
). There are optimal tolls where the toll on every edge is 0 or ∞. If P = NP, there is no 4 3 − ǫ -approximation algorithm for the problem of computing optimal tolls in networks with linear latency functions, for any ǫ > 0.
Let Γ = G = (V, E), l, s, t, d be an instance of a routing game with linear latencies. Let m = |E| ≥ 2. By scaling latency functions suitably, we may assume that d = 1. Then, for any latency functions l ′ , the latency of the Nash flow for l ′ equals the common delay of all flow-carrying s-t paths. Let L = C(l; f NE ) be the latency of the Nash flow for l. Let τ * be optimal {0, ∞}-tolls, L * = C l + τ * , f NE (τ * ) be the optimal cost, and K * := {e ∈ E : τ * e = ∞}. We can view τ * as simulating the removal of edges in K * .
We create the following Bayesian routing game. Let G 1 = (V 1 , E 1 ), s 1 , t 1 and G 2 = (V 2 , E 2 ), s 2 , t 2 be two copies of (G, l, s, t). Add vertices s, t, and edges (s, s 1 ), (s, s 2 ) and (t 1 , t), (t 2 , t). Call the graph thus created H. For e ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 with corresponding edge e ′ ∈ E, set the latency function in the new graph h e (x) = l e ′ (x), and set h e (x) = 0 for e = (s, s 1 ), (s, s 2 ), (t 1 , t), (t 2 , t). The states of nature correspond to edges in H. We set λ θ = 1/m 2 for all θ ∈ E 1 ∪ E 2 ; the remaining 1 − 2 m mass is spread equally on (s, s 1 ), (s, s 2 ). We set h θ e (x) = h e (x) + 8m 3 L if θ = e and h e (x) otherwise. Our Bayesian routing game is (G, {h θ e } θ,e , s, t, d), λ . The idea here is that state θ encodes the removal of edge θ: specifically, if µ θ = Ω 1 m for a posterior µ, then h µ simulates removing edge θ due to the large constant term 8m 3 L. Let K i be the edge-set corresponding to K * in G i , for i = 1, 2. The prior λ is set up so that: (a) it admits a convex decomposition into posteriors µ 1 , µ 2 , where h µ i simulates that G i \ K i is connected to s and G 3−i is disconnected from s; and (b) any convex-decomposition of λ must be such that a large weight is placed on posteriors µ, where h µ simulates that only one of G i is connected to s, so that {µ e 8m 3 L} e∈E i yields tolls τ for edges in E such that C l + τ, f NE (τ ) ≤ val(µ). Lemma 5.3 makes the statements in (a) and (b) precise, and Theorem 5.1 follows immediately from Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.2.
Lemma 5.3. There is a signaling scheme for the above Bayesian routing game with latency L * . Further, given a signaling scheme α for the above Bayesian routing game with expected latency L ′ , one can obtain tolls τ such that the routing game (G, l + τ, s, t, d) has Nash latency at most
Proof. We first show the existence of a signaling scheme with latency L * . Define posterior µ 1 ∈ ∆ E H as:
, and this is our signaling scheme. We will show that val(µ 1 ) = val(µ 2 ) ≤ L * , proving the lemma.
Consider distribution µ 1 ; the argument for µ 2 is symmetrical. The idea is that an edge e with µ 1 e > 0 has h µ 1 e (x) ≥ 8mL, which effectively deletes e from H; other edges have h
e (x) = h e (x). So µ 1 simulates retaining edges in G 1 \ K 1 . Let f = f NE (τ * ) be the Nash flow in the routing game (G, l + τ * , s, t, d). So C(l + τ * ; f ) = L * . Recall that d = 1, so every s-t path in G has latency at least L * . Then the flow that sends d on edges (s, s 1 ) and (t 1 , t) and f on edges of G 1 , is feasible. On every edge e ∈ E(H) with positive flow, µ 1 e = 0, so the latency of this flow under h µ 1 is L * . Further, this is a Nash flow for h µ 1 : any s-t path P either contains an edge with µ 1 e > 0, and if not, contains an s 1 -t 1 path; in the latter case, there is a corresponding s-t path Q in G, and the latency of P under h µ 1 equals (l + τ * ) Q (f ), which is at least L * since f is the Nash flow for l + τ * .
Next, we show how to obtain the required tolls from the signaling scheme α (with expected latency L ′ ). Assume L ′ ≤ L, otherwise τ = 0 suffices. At least (1 − 4/m) of the probability mass of α must be on posteriors µ with µ (s,s 1 ) + µ (s,s 2 ) ≥ 1/m. There must exist such a posterior µ ′ with val(µ ′ ) ≤
; the other case is symmetric. Let f = f µ ′ be the Nash flow for latency functions h µ ′ . (Again, since d = 1, every s-t path P in H with f e > 0 for all e ∈ P satisfies h
, we must have f (s,s 1 ) = 0, so f is supported on G 2 . Abusing notation, for e ∈ E 2 , we also use e to denote the corresponding edge in E. For every e ∈ E 2 , we have h µ ′ e (x) = l e (x) + µ ′ e 8m 3 L. Thus, defining τ e = µ ′ e 8m 3 L for all e ∈ E, we obtain that f restricted to E 2 is a Nash flow for (G, l + τ, s, t, d), and its latency is at most val(µ ′ ). This is easy to see, since every s-t path P in G corresponds to an s 2 -t 2 path Q in H, and (l + τ
Theorem 5.4. The full-revelation signaling scheme, i.e., revealing the state of nature, has the price of anarchy for the underlying latency functions as its approximation ratio. In particular, for linear latencies, it achieves a 4 3 -approximation.
Proof. Recall that the price of anarchy (PoA) for a class of latency functions is the maximum ratio, over all instances involving these latency functions, of the latencies of the Nash flow and optimal flow. For linear latency functions, the PoA is 4 3 [RT02] . Intuitively, the result follows because full-revelation is the best signaling scheme if one seeks to minimize the expected latency of the optimal flow, and the multiplicative error that results from this change in objective (from the latency of the Nash flow to that of the optimal flow) cannot exceed the price of anarchy.
Slightly abusing notation, we use f θ to denote the Nash flow with respect to the latency functions {l θ e }. We usef θ to denote the optimal flow for latency functions {l θ e }. Let ρ be the price of anarchy for the collection {l θ e } e∈E,θ∈Θ of latency functions, so we have C(l θ ;f θ ) ≥ C(l θ ; f θ )/ρ for all θ ∈ Θ. The full-revelation signaling scheme has cost θ∈Θ λ θ C(l θ ; f θ ).
Consider any signaling scheme α. Its cost is
6 Extensions: hardness results for related problems
Maximum prior problem
This is the closely-related problem of finding µ ∈ ∆ M that maximizes opt(µ). The proof of Theorem 4.2 in fact shows that a PTAS for the maximum-prior problem yields a PTAS for threshold signaling. Theorem 6.1 uses this implication to rule out a PTAS for the maximum prior problem under the exponential time hypothesis (ETH) by giving a simple, clean reduction from the best-Nash problem in general two-player games, for which a PTAS is ruled out by [BKW15] . Theorem 6.1. Assuming ETH, there is a constant ε 0 such that, any algorithm that returns an (additive) ε 0 -approximation for the maximum prior problem, even for extended security games, must run in quasipolynomial, i.e., nΩ (log 1−o(1) n) , time. In particular, assuming ETH, there is no PTAS for the maximum prior problem, even for extended security games.
Recall that, as noted earlier, the proof of Theorem 4.2 shows that, for any ε, a polytime ε-approximation for the maximum prior problem yields a polytime algorithm for the threshold signaling problem with precision parameter 2ε. Thus, it suffices to show that, assuming ETH, there is some constant ǫ 0 such that solving the threshold signaling problem with precision parameter ǫ 0 , even for extended security games, requires quasipolynomial running time. To show this, we reduce from the problem of finding an ǫ-Nash equilibrium in a general two-player game with ǫ-approximate social welfare, and utilize the following hardness result for this problem.
Theorem 6.2 ([BKW15]
). Assuming ETH, there is a constant ǫ * > 0 such that any algorithm for finding an ǫ * -approximate Nash equilibrium with social welfare at least OPT − ǫ * in a general bimatrix game requires nΩ (log 1−o(1) n) time, where OPT is the optimal welfare of a Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let (R, C) be a bimatrix game, where R, C ∈ [−1, 1] m×n are the payoffs for the row-and column-players respectively. To avoid confusion with the extended security game, we refer to the row-and column-players in the bimatrix game as the R-and C-players. A pair of mixed strategies (x, y) for the R-and C-players respectively is an ε-approximate equilibrium if:
The social welfare of (x, y) is defined as x T (R + C)y. Let OPT be the maximum social welfare of a (mixed) Nash equilibrium of (R, C). Note that −2 ≤ OPT ≤ 2. We construct an extended security game where the states of nature correspond to the pure strategies of the C-player (in the bimatrix game), and the row-player's pure strategies (in the extended security game) correspond to the R-player's strategies (in the bimatrix game). We will set things up so that the expected payoff in the extended security game to the row player under a posterior distribution µ and when he plays a mixed strategy x is a linear combination of the LHS of (4) (viewing (x, µ) as a mixed-strategy profile for the bimatrix game (R, C)) and the social welfare of (x, µ) in the bimatrix game (R, C). Let ǫ > 0 be a parameter. The payoffs in the extended security game will have absolute value at most 1 + O(1/ǫ). We will show that solving the threshold signaling problem for the resulting extended security game with threshold η = η ′ − ǫ, and precision parameter ǫ yields a 6ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of (R, C) with social welfare at least η ′ − 2ǫ, whenever there is a Nash equilibrium of (R, C) with social welfare at least η ′ or we state that we are in case (i) of the threshold signaling problem. So via binary search, we can obtain a 6ǫ-approximate Nash equilibrium of (R, C) with social welfare at least OPT − 3ǫ. Thus, setting ǫ 0 = Θ(ǫ * 2 ), 3 where ǫ * is as given by Theorem 6.2, we obtain that, assuming ETH, the threshold signaling problem with precision parameter ǫ 0 requires quasipolynomial time, completing the proof.
We proceed to describe the extended security game and prove the desired claim. We set Θ = [n], so M = n. The row-player's pure strategy set is [m] , and the column-player's pure-strategy set is [m] × [n], so the row-and column-players have r = m and c = mn pure strategies respectively. The r × c matrix A, r × M matrix B, and c × M matrix D in the extended security game are given by
Proof. Consider any column-player strategy k
The claim follows.
It follows from Claim 6.3 that for any µ ∈ ∆ M , we have
3 We need additive error Θ(ǫ * ) when payoffs are bounded in absolute value by 1 + O(1/ǫ * ); when we scale payoffs so that they lie in [−1, 1], this translates to an Θ(ǫ * Now suppose we solve the threshold signaling problem with threshold η = η ′ − ǫ (where η ′ ≤ 2) and precision parameter ǫ. Suppose (x * , µ * ) is a Nash equilibrium of (R, C) with social welfare at least η ′ . It follows from (5) that val(µ * ) ≥ η ′ . So we are not in case (ii) of the threshold signaling problem, and must obtain µ ∈ ∆ n such that val(µ) ≥ η − ǫ = η ′ − 2ǫ. From (5), this implies that there is x ∈ ∆ m such that x T (R + C)µ ≥ η ′ − 2ǫ and max i∈ [m] (Rµ) i + max
where the last inequality follows since R, C ∈ [−1, 1] m×n . The same calculation holds whenever we state that we are in case (i) and return µ ∈ ∆ n .
Hardness with other equilibrium notions
It is known that in zero-sum games, correlated equilibria and Nash equilibria are payoff-equivalent, that is, they yield the same payoffs (this was also noted in [Dug14] ). Thus, our hardness results extend to the case of correlated equilibria, as well as other notions of stability that are payoffequivalent to Nash equilibria in zero-sum games. To see this, note that for µ ∈ ∆ M , due to the payoff equivalence, val(µ) is also the payoff of the row player in any correlated equilibrium in the zero-sum game specified by A µ . Hence, the statement of the signaling problem and its optimal value remain unchanged. Further, any signaling scheme for correlated equilibria gives a signaling scheme for Nash equilibria of equal value. This immediately extends all our hardness results (Theorem 4.1, Theorem 4.3, Theorem 4.4, Theorem 6.1) to correlated equilibria (and other payoff-equivalent equilibria).
Signaling with general objective functions
We now consider a more general signaling problem in Bayesian zero-sum games, where the principal's value may depend on the players' strategies, and show that it is NP-hard to obtain a PTAS. Formally, we have a Bayesian zero-sum game Θ, {A θ } θ∈Θ , λ and a Θ × r × c principal objec-
is the set of all (exact) Nash equilibria of A µ . As before, we seek a signaling scheme (Σ, α, µ) that maximizes σ∈Σ α σ val(µ σ ).
Theorem 6.4. Given a Bayesian zero-sum game Θ, {A θ } θ∈Θ , λ , and a principal objective tensor F, it is NP-hard to distinguish whether the optimal signaling scheme has value 0 or at least The NP-hardness proof follows from a reduction from the balanced vertex cover (BVC) problem proposed in [CS06] . In BVC, we are given a graph G = (V, E), and we want to know if G has a vertex cover of size |V | 2 . Given an instance of BVC with n nodes, we construct the following Bayesian zero-sum game where the states of nature correspond to nodes of G and the prior is λ = 1 n /n.
The row player's pure strategy is to pick a node v 1 ∈ V , and the column player's pure strategy is to either pick a vertex v, an edge e, or a special strategy s. We design the column player's payoff as follows. The payoff for strategy
otherwise. e is n n−2 if e is not incident with θ, 0 otherwise. s is 1.
The principal's objective tensor is set up so that he is interested only in getting the column player to play the strategy s, that is, F θ (v, s) = 1 for all θ, v ∈ V ; all other entries of F are 0.
Lemma 6.5. The Bayesian zero-sum game defined above has a signaling scheme of value at least 1 2 if and only if G has a vertex cover of size n 2 . Proof. First, suppose G has a vertex cover C with |C| = n 2 . The principal simply signals if θ ∈ C or not. That is, λ is decomposed as (µ 1 + µ 2 )/2, where µ 1 v = 2 n for all v ∈ C (and 0 otherwise), and µ 2 v = 2 n for all v / ∈ C. For posterior µ 1 , there is a Nash equilibrium where the row player chooses the mixed strategy x that picks v 1 ∈ V \ C uniformly at random and the column player chooses strategy s; thus, the principal gets a value of 1. This is because every node and edge is "protected" with probability at least 2 n ; the payoff of the column player for a pure strategy v or e is therefore at most n n−2 1 − 2 n ≤ 1. Since µ 1 is chosen with probability On the other hand, we show that if µ is a posterior with val(µ) > 0, then G has a BVC solution. Let (x, y) be a Nash equilibrium that attains value val(µ), that is, val(µ) = x T ( θ µ θ F θ )y. Since val(µ) > 0, we must have y s > 0. For this to happen, every node in V must be protected with probability at least 2 n . That is, we must have n n−2 (1 − x v )(1 − µ v ) ≤ 1 for all v ∈ V . Then, n − 2 + v x v µ v = v (1 − x v )(1 − µ v ) ≤ n − 2, which implies that we must have x v µ v = 0 and (1 − x v )(1 − µ v ) = 1 − 2 n for all v ∈ V . So it must be that for all v ∈ V , exactly one of µ v and x v is equal to 2 n . Let C = {v : µ v > 0}. It follows that |C| = n 2 . The payoff of a column player for an edge e = (u, v) is n n−2 (1 − µ u − µ v ), which must be at most 1, so we have µ u + µ v ≥ 2 n . It follows that C is a vertex cover of G.
We remark that it is important to allow the principal's payoff to depend on specific strategies, and also to enforce exact Nash equilibrium. Intuitively, these two ingredients together make the objective function val(µ) very "sensitive" in µ. Moreover, these two conditions are essentially necessary for an NP-hardness result, as Cheng et al. [CCD + 15] gave a bi-criteria quasi-PTAS for this general signaling problem, i.e., a quasi-polytime algorithm that loses an additive ǫ in the objective as well as in the Nash equilibrium constraints.
A Proof of Lemma 4.5
Recall that ǫ > 0, c 3 ≥ 10 3 , and k = k(n) satisfies k = ω(log n) and k = o( √ n), and r = Θ(n/k).
Let p = 1 2 . First, we proceed as in [Dug14] to reduce the planted-clique problem to the planted-cliquecover problem. Given an instance G of PClique(n, p, k), we can generate an instance G ′ of PCover(n, p, k, r) by planting r − 1 additional random k-cliques into G (as in step (2) of Definition 2.1). As noted in [Dug14] , because the cliques S 1 , . . . , S r are indistinguishable, recovering a constant fraction of the planted cliques from G ′ would recover each of S 1 , . . . , S r with constant probability. In particular, it can recover the original planted clique with constant probability.
So our task is the following. Given a graph G ∼ G(n, p, k, r), fix one of the planted k-cliques S ⊆ V . We need to show that given a cluster T ⊆ V satisfying |S ∩ T | ≥ ǫ|T | and |S ∩ T | ≥ c 3 log n, we can recover S with high probability. We assume that r = 5n k in the sequel. Our algorithm is similar to (and in fact, simpler than) the one used in [Dug14] to prove a similar planted-clique recovery result (Lemma 3.5 therein). However, we need to recover the planted clique under a much weaker (both qualitatively and quantitatively) assumption. In our case, the above requirements on |S ∩ T | allow |T | = Θ(log n) (which is crucial for the soundness proof in Lemma 4.6 to go through); in [Dug14] , the requirement is that |S ∩ T | = Ω(|S ∪ T |) with |S| = ω(log 2 n), so that we must have |T | = ω(log 2 n). This difference in the magnitude of |T | (and hence |S ∩ T |) poses certain challenges and necessitates certain key changes to the analysis in [Dug14] .
We use the following algorithm to recover S:
1. Pick an arbitrary set R of c 3 log n vertices from S ∩ T .
2. Let S ′ be all the common neighbors of R.
3. LetŜ be the vertices in S ′ with at least k − 1 neighbors in S ′ .
Since S is unknown, we use the following process to simulate Step (1). We first sample roughly c 3 log n ǫ vertices uniformly from T , and try Step (2) and (3) on every subset of c 3 log n of the sampled vertices. The number of subsets we need to check is polynomial. Moreover, because |S ∩ T | ≥ ǫ|T |, with high probability, the sampled subset of T will contain c 3 log n vertices from S ∩ T , and will encounter this set of c 3 log n vertices from S ∩ T in our enumeration.
We partition the edges of G into E − and E + , where E − are the background edges added in Step (1) of Definition 2.1, and E + are the extra clique-related edges added in Step (2) of Definition 2.1. Let E i denote the edges of S i . It is easy to verify that all the nodes in S will survive Step (2) and (3), so S ⊆Ŝ. We show that in fact, with high probability, no other vertices survive Step (2) and (3) through the following claims.
Claim A.1. With high probability, we have |E − (v, S)| ≤ 0.6|S| for all v / ∈ S.
Proof. Since |S| = ω(log n), this follows from a straightforward application of the Chernoff bound and the union bound.
Claim A.2. With high probability, there are at most c 3 log n vertices v / ∈ R with |E − (v, R)| ≥ 0.8|R|.
Proof. Let A = {v / ∈ R : |E − (v, R)| ≥ 0.8|R|}. Then, bi-density G − (R, A) ≥ 0.8. The constant c 3 = 10 3 and ε = 0.3 satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.8. So since |R| ≥ c 3 log n, we have |A| < c 3 log n with high probability.
